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POSTJUDGMENT COST SHIFTING:
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)
SAMANTHA J. KWARTLER†
The more information there is to discover, the more expensive it
is to discover all the relevant information until, in the end,
“discovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but also about
how much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter”1

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action” brought in federal court.2 Accordingly, the Rules permit
the discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense.”3 The idea behind this liberal discovery
rule is that this information will allow parties to know their
respective positions in a dispute and reach a resolution in a quick
and efficient manner.4
Despite its benefits, however, liberal discovery in the modern
information age certainly has its burdens.5
Advancing
technology has made the digitization of information commonplace

†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 2016,
St. John’s University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Paul Kirgis for his
guidance in writing this Note. The author would also like to thank her family and
friends for their support and encouragement.
1
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting
Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
2002)).
2
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
3
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
4
See Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 Amendments to
the Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and Are Revitalizing
the Civil Justice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2011), http://jolt.richmond.edu/
v17i3/article10.pdf.
5
See id. at 3.
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and has led to an exponential growth in volumes of information.6
The current technological landscape creates a problematic
situation for parties litigating in the federal court system: The
existence of more information means more information that is
subject to discovery requests.7 In effect, what would amount to
thousands of paper documents in the predigitization era is
equivalent to several million pages of electronically stored
information (“ESI”) today.8 The cost of finding, reviewing, and
producing this immense volume of potentially relevant
information has reached unprecedented heights and threatens
the purposes of the justice system.9
Fortunately, there may be an outlet for litigants facing
immense electronic discovery costs. Rule 54 provides that
“[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides
otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed
The corollary of this rule is
to the prevailing party.”10
28 U.S.C. § 1920:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as
costs the following: (1) [f]ees of the clerk and marshal; (2) [f]ees
for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case; (3) [f]ees and disbursements for
printing and witnesses; (4) [f]ees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) [d]ocket fees under
section 1923 of this title; (6) [c]ompensation of court appointed
experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under
section 1828 of this title.11

6
See id. Part of the reason there is so much electronically stored information is
that it is far easier to store this information than to dispose of it. See Andrew Mast,
Note, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 56
WAYNE L. REV. 1825, 1830–31 (2010); see also Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429 (explaining
that electronic “[i]nformation is retained not because it is expected to be used, but
because there is no compelling reason to discard it”).
7
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 3.
8
See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564–70 (2010).
9
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 4; see also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5
(2008), available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/
EDiscovery_View_Front_Lines2007.pdf (stating that a “midsize” case could cost $2.5
to $3.5 million in the processing, review, and production of electronic information).
10
See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
11
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012).
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The statute operates as a grant and a limit upon a court’s
authority to award costs.12 Under § 1920(4), prevailing litigants
may file a bill of costs documenting their discovery expenses as
“the costs of making copies of any materials.”13 Thus, litigants
face the possibility of bearing a portion of their adversaries’
discovery costs.
Although § 1920 operates to limit taxable costs, in the
electronic discovery context, these expenses can soar into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars.14 Such expenses accrue due to
the complex nature of electronic discovery.15 Discovery of ESI
exponentially expands the materials a producing party must turn
over.16 The production of immense amounts of ESI comes at a
price that may be disproportionate to the value of the controversy
at issue.17 Consequently, there is a risk of undermining the
litigation system’s fairness and efficiency.18

12
See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012);
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441–42 (1987).
13
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
14
In a recent electronic discovery taxation case, the prevailing litigant sought to
recover $243,453.02 in electronic discovery vendor costs. See CBT Flint Partners,
LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
15
See Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI
Discovery Disputes: A Five Factor Test To Promote Consistency and Set Party
Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569, 571 (2009); Mast, supra note 6, at 1830.
16
Daniel M. Kolkey & Chuck Ragan, Reevaluating the Rules for E-Discovery,
S.F. DAILY J., May 21, 2010, at 7. For instance, a producing party may need to
produce daily conversations in the form of text messages, e-mails, and voicemails in
addition to the traditional documentary evidence. Id. The Sedona Conference
describes the following as electronically stored information that may be produced
during discovery: “email, web pages, word processing files, audio and video files,
images, computer databases, and virtually anything that is stored on a computing
device—including but not limited to servers, desktops, laptops, cell phones, hard
drives, flash drives, PDAs and MP3 players.” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE
SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 1 (2d ed. 2007), available at
https://thesedonaconference.org/publication/The%20Sedona%20Principles.
The
Sedona Principles are promulgated by the Sedona Conference to provide guidance on
tipping point issues in complex litigation. See About Us, SEDONA CONF.,
https://thesedonaconference.org/aboutus (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
17
Kolkey & Ragan, supra note 16.
18
Id.
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While the issue has not gone unnoticed,19 the courts disagree
over which electronic discovery costs are taxable under § 1920(4)
as “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies.”20
Traditionally, many courts adopted a broad interpretation of the
statutory language and taxed all or nearly all of a party’s
However, since case law
electronic discovery costs.21
developments in 2012, many courts have turned away from such
sweeping cost taxation. In 2012, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed cost taxation under
§ 1920(4)’s “costs of making copies” language and adopted a strict
narrow interpretation.22 The Third Circuit, relying on the
statutory background, held that only the narrowest
interpretation of the statutory language is permissible and taxed
only the costs associated with scanning and file conversion.23
Three months later, the United States Supreme Court considered
which costs are recoverable under § 1920(6) as “compensation of
interpreters” and held that taxable costs are narrow in scope.24
With this background in mind, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, applying the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s law, adopted a loose
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “costs of making copies”
language and taxed more electronic discovery services than the
Third Circuit, further complicating the split of authority among
the circuit courts.25 It is the tension between these varying
interpretations and the related electronic discovery services with
19
The increasing use of electronic discovery and its associated burden and
expense has prompted various changes. One such change was the 2006 amendment
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory
committee notes (amended 2006) (noting that the exponential growth of recoverable
information influenced the amendment). Another change was the adoption of
Federal Rule of Evidence 502. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes
(explaining the rule was adopted, in part, to address the proliferation of electronic
information).
20
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012).
21
See infra Part II.
22
See Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 169 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic
discovery consultant charges, such as the District Court’s ruling in this case, are
untethered from the statutory mooring.”).
23
See id. at 171.
24
See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
25
See CBT Flint Partners v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Our application of section 1920(4) apparently differs from two circuits in one
way—regarding the stage-one costs of imaging source media and extracting
documents in a way that preserves metadata.”).
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which this Note is concerned. To ensure uniformity among the
courts and prevent abuse of the liberal discovery rules, this issue
needs to be resolved.
This Note argues that the circuit courts should adopt a loose
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4), like the Federal Circuit did in
CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,26 and tax only a
limited number of the electronic discovery services rendered in
document production. Part I of this Note examines § 1920(4)’s
statutory history and its application in federal court. Part II
discusses the varying approaches taken by each side of the circuit
split. Finally, Part III argues for implementation of a loose
narrow interpretation because it more appropriately comports
with other provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
encourages litigants to scrutinize their discovery requests, and
minimizes the potential misuse of the adversarial system.
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND COST SHIFTING IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS

I.

While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit liberal
discovery, in the modern information age where voluminous
amounts of ESI exist, the costs associated with electronic
discovery have reached unimaginable heights. Although parties
may attempt to shift costs prior to trial, litigants may also seek
to shift electronic discovery costs postjudgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and its corollary § 1920(4).
The evolution of electronic discovery, amendments to the Federal
Rules, and the statutory history of § 1920 all shed light on the
electronic discovery costs that are properly taxable under the
statute.

26

737 F.3d 1320.
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A.

Electronic Discovery and American Jurisprudence in General

1.

Historical Overview: The Rise of Electronic Discovery
Creates a Problematic Situation

With the rapid computerization of the 1990s and the
decrease in storage space costs in the 2000s, electronically stored
documents began to remain solely in electronic form.27 The
computerized environment replaced traditional warehouse
productions, which were limited by the manpower available to
Corporations embraced the changing
photocopy data.28
landscape by implementing archival systems designed to recover
lost data, which led to the existence of more potentially relevant
documents.29 As long as a plaintiff could demonstrate that the
information was “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence,” the information could be subject to
production pursuant to the liberal discovery standard under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).30
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intentionally permit
liberal discovery. Liberal discovery rules allow parties to know
their respective positions in a dispute and to reach a resolution in
a quick and efficient manner.31 Additionally, the rules operate to
eliminate surprises and to assist parties in their preparation for
trial.32 While these considerations certainly support the “just”
and “speedy” determination of actions in federal courts, liberal
discovery in the modern information age undermines litigants’
ability to resolve disputes in an “inexpensive” manner and
threatens the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

27
See Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should Discovery Come with a Bill?
Assessing Cost Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523, 1532
(2010).
28
See id.
29
See id. at 1533.
30
Id. at 1533 & n.52 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)) (internal quotation mark
omitted); Borden et al., supra note 4, at 3 (“The creation of more information means
there is more available, and potentially relevant, information to a party’s claim or
defense, and thus more information subject to discovery.”).
31
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 2.
32
See Patrick T. Gillen, Oppressive Taxation: Abuse of Rule 54 and Section 1920
Threatens Justice, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 235, 238 (2012).
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The increased costs associated with electronic discovery
result primarily from the sheer volume of ESI that is created and
stored.33 The widespread use of computers, the Internet, smart
phones, and other technologies creates vast amounts of electronic
information.34 In contrast to the physical space that paper
documents took up in traditional discovery, electronic
information is stored on electronic systems, which store large
volumes of information at a low cost.35 Despite the minimal costs
associated with storing electronic information, the computerized
environment lends itself to “tremendous restoration and
processing expenses,” and, as a whole, electronic discovery is
significantly more expensive than paper discovery.36 Although
intended to accomplish the same goals, electronic discovery
differs from paper discovery in several ways: (1) volume and
duplicability, (2) persistence, (3) dynamic and changeable
content, (4) metadata, (5) environment, and (6) dispersion and
searchability.37 Such differences account for the vast disparity in
costs between paper and electronic discovery.38 When electronic
discovery costs exceed the amount in controversy, there is a risk
of misusing the litigation system.39 Since requesting parties have
nearly all the control over the scope and content of the request,
requesting parties may use electronic discovery as a litigation
tool.40 The producing party must locate, search, and produce
responsive documents so there is little incentive for a requesting
party to narrow the scope of its request.41 Consequently,
requesting parties submit broad, costly requests as a tactic to
entice the producing party to settle in order to avoid costs.42

33
Jacqueline Hoelting, Note, Skin in the Game: Litigation Incentives Changing
as Courts Embrace a “Loser Pays” Rule for E-Discovery Costs, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1103, 1108 (2013).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1109.
36
Vainberg, supra note 27; Altman & Lewis, supra note 15; Mast, supra note 6,
at 1826 (“While litigation has moved from paper discovery to electronic discovery,
the net effect of the move to electronic format has been to raise, not lower, discovery
costs.”).
37
THE SEDONA CONF., supra note 16, at 2–5.
38
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 4.
39
Kolkey & Ragan, supra note 16; Hoelting, supra note 33, at 111213.
40
See Hoelting, supra note 33, at 1111.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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Traditionally, the “American Rule” presumes that the
producing party bears its own costs in responding to discovery
requests.43 Unique challenges accompany the discovery of ESI,
which result in higher costs than those associated with
conventional discovery.44
While postjudgment cost taxation
under § 1920 is a new and developing option for litigants to
remedy the burdensome expenses of electronic discovery, parties
have also sought to shift costs through other avenues.45 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits a responding party to
“invoke the district court’s discretion . . . to grant orders
protecting [it] from ‘undue burden or expense’ in doing so,
including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s
payment of the costs of discovery.”46 In what has been considered
the most influential electronic discovery decision, Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC,47 the court announced an approach to cost
shifting in electronic discovery. The Zubulake court articulated a
strict cost-shifting standard: There could be no cost shifting
unless the requested information was stored in an “inaccessible”
form.48 While Zubulake remains the dominant approach to cost
shifting in electronic discovery, commentators have criticized its
“inaccessibility” requirement as unduly restrictive.49
In short, the liberal discovery rules in the modern
information age create immense burdens for parties litigating in
the federal courts. Widespread use of computers and the
digitization of information have led to the existence of massive
volumes of potentially relevant information.50 A litigant “may
serve on any other party a request such within the scope of Rule
26(b)” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34,51 and a

43
Mast, supra note 6, at 1826. The American Rule is discussed further infra in
Part I.C.2.a.
44
Mast, supra note 6, at 1827.
45
Id.
46
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(alteration in original) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
358 (1978)) (internal quotation mark omitted); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“The court may,
for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or
expense . . . .”).
47
217 F.R.D. at 317–24.
48
See id. at 324.
49
Mast, supra note 6, at 1829.
50
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 3.
51
FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
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responding party must produce it, despite the associated cost, or
face the possibility of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37 for “fail[ing] to obey an order.”52
2.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Are Amended To
Combat Electronic Discovery Issues

This problematic situation has not gone unnoticed. In 2006,
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into
effect to combat electronic discovery issues and minimize costs.53
Specifically, Rule 26 and Rule 34 underwent several seemingly
modest changes to modernize the discovery framework in an
attempt to account for the explosion of the use of ESI.54
First, Rule 26(a)(1)(B), now Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), was
amended to include ESI as part of the information that must be
included in initial disclosures.55 Second, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) was
amended to permit a party to withhold discoverable information
that is stored in a way that is “not reasonably accessible because
of undue burden or cost,” subject to the requesting party’s right
to file a motion to compel the disclosure of such material if “good
cause” exists.56 Third, Rule 26(f) was amended to include
additional discussion points for litigants to consider when
formulating a discovery plan.57
52
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery, . . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just
orders.”).
53
Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court,
to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 12, 2006),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see Borden
et al., supra note 4, at 6; Mast, supra note 6, at 1826.
54
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 12. This Note only addresses relevant
amendments.
55
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (amended 2006);
Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice &
Procedure 23, 30–31 (May 27, 2005), available at http:// www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf [hereinafter Report of the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm.].
56
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006);
Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 55, at 50–53.
57
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (amended 2006); Report of the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 55, at 31–33, 38–39 (adding three items for
discussion: (1) issues about the preservation of discoverable information, (2) issues
related to the disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, and
(3) issues pertaining to information that is requested or disclosed in discovery that is
privileged or subject to work product protection).
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Rule 34 was amended in two ways. First, Rule 34(a) was
changed to include ESI as discoverable material.58 Second, Rule
34(b) was amended to permit a requesting party to specify the
form in which information is produced.59 These amendments
emphasize cooperation among litigants and provide an avenue
through which parties must discuss potential electronic discovery
issues before discovery begins.60
While the amendments recognize that ESI is an integral
aspect of discovery, it is doubtful that these changes provide
producing parties with adequate financial relief.61 Since the
Federal Rules do not define “good cause,” it is difficult for the
courts to determine when the production of ESI is
inappropriate.62 Consequently, very few courts actually set
production limitations or shift costs.63
Moreover, “[t]he
rules . . . do not dissuade requesting parties from making broad
discovery requests and providing erroneous reasons why good
cause exists.”64 Thus, litigants are turning to postjudgment cost
taxation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and § 1920 as
an avenue to avoid burdensome electronic discovery costs.
However, a great deal of uncertainty exists surrounding the
proper interpretation of § 1920 and the electronic discovery costs
that are fairly taxable under its provisions.
B.

The Taxation of Costs: A Discussion of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 and § 1920

Over the past decade, Congress and the courts have taken
steps to clarify the elusive § 1920. Such uncertainty exists
because Congress did not define “exemplification” as it is used in
§ 1920(4) and it is unclear to what extent “copies” encompasses
the production of ESI.65 In determining whether prevailing
litigants are entitled to any portion of their electronic discovery
costs, the courts are looking to § 1920’s statutory history and
58
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006); Report of the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 55, at 70–71, 80.
59
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006); Report of the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 55, at 71–72, 81.
60
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 16–17.
61
Hoelting, supra note 33, at 1117.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1118; Vainberg, supra note 27, at 1565.
64
Hoelting, supra note 33, at 1117.
65
Id. at 1118–19.
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jurisprudential developments for guidance.
While our
understanding of § 1920 has certainly developed, many issues
surrounding § 1920 and electronic discovery remain unresolved.
The information that is available provides a helpful background
in understanding the contemporary issue.
1.

The Evolution of Cost Taxation in the Federal Courts

The principles embodied in § 1920 first appeared in the Fee
Act of 1853, which provided that “the following and no other
compensation shall be taxed and allowed.”66 The Act was the
first piece of legislation outlining the costs allowable in federal
court.67 It was created in response to the diverse practices among
the courts and the exorbitant fees awarded to prevailing
parties.68 Thus, the Act operated as a departure from the
“English Rule,” which dictates that the losing party bears the
burden of all legal fees, and pushed the courts to the American
Rule.69 The American Rule is “the general policy that all
litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s
fees.”70 Under the American Rule, courts generally do not have
the discretion to shift litigation costs unless Congress has created
a specific exception.71 Congress included the principles embodied
in the Fee Act in the Revised Judicial Code of 1948 as
28 U.S.C. § 1920.72
Section 1920 “now embodies Congress’
considered choice as to the kinds of expenses that a federal court
may tax as costs against the losing party.”73

66
See Breena N. Meng, Taxing Costs of Electronic Discovery—A Review, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 163, 164–65 (2013); Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat.
161.
67
See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2001 (2012).
68
Id.; Race Tires Am. v. Hoosier Racing Co., 674 F.3d 158, 164 (3d Cir. 2012).
69
See Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 164.
70
Jason L. Callaway, Tethered to the Statute: How the Third Circuit’s Narrow
Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) Will Shape the Future of Cost-Shifting and EDiscovery for the Better, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 191, 194–95 (2014) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 98 (10th ed. 2014)). Courts apply the American Rule expansively to
encompass most expenses of litigation, not just attorney fees. Id. at 194.
71
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975).
72
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 164. The principles embodied in the Act were first
transmitted through the Revised Statutes of 1874 and the Judicial Code of 1911 to
the Revised Code of 1948. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2001. The statute was
codified “without any apparent intent to change the controlling rules.” Id. (quoting
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 255).
73
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440 (1987).
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Section 1920 defines the term costs as it is used in Rule 54(d)
and enumerates expenses that a federal court is permitted to tax
as a cost under its discretionary authority.74 Section 1920
provides, in relevant part: “A judge or clerk of any court of the
United States may tax as costs . . . [f]ees for exemplification and
the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case.”75 In turn, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides in part: “Unless a federal
statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise,
costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the
prevailing party.”76 “The logical conclusion from the language
and interrelation of these provisions is that . . . § 1920 provides
that the fee may be taxed as a cost, and Rule 54(d) provides that
the cost shall be taxed against the losing party.”77
Although Congress used permissive language in the statute,
the courts are only authorized to tax costs the statute
encompasses.78 “If Rule 54(d) grants courts discretion to tax
whatever costs may seem appropriate, then § 1920, which
enumerates the costs that may be taxed, serves no role
whatsoever.”79 Thus, § 1920 defines the term “costs” as used in
Rule 54(d). “[Section] 1920 enumerates expenses that a federal
court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority found
in Rule 54(d).”80 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) grants the
courts authority to tax costs listed in § 1920 but forbids them
Since
from awarding costs not included in the statute.81
Congress did not define “exemplification” or explain what
constitutes “cost[s] of making copies,” the courts are tasked with
interpreting such phrases.82

74

See Crawford, 482 U.S. at 441–42; Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2006.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012).
76
FED. R. CIV. P. 54.
77
Crawford, 482 U.S. at 441.
78
See id. at 441–42.
79
See id. at 441.
80
Id. at 441–42.
81
See id. at 441.
82
Cf. id. at 440–41. In Crawford, the provision at issue was § 1920(3), which
provides that “Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses” are taxable costs
under § 1920. Id. at 440. “The witness fee specified in § 1920(3) is defined in
28 U.S.C. § 1821.” Id. In contrast, there is no other statutory provision defining the
words in § 1920(4).
75
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While the link between Rule 54(d) and § 1920(4) is well
established, the extent to which electronic discovery costs are
taxable under this authority is uncertain.83 Congress most
recently amended the statute in 2008, when it substituted the
word “materials” for “papers” in recognition of advancing
technology.84 The statute was specifically amended to account for
costs related to electronic discovery.85 The congressional record
explains that the Judicial Administration and Technical
Amendments Act of 2008 was “intended to improve the
administration and efficiency of our Federal court system by
replacing antiquated processes and bureaucratic hurdles with
the necessary tools for the 21st century.”86
Additionally,
Representative Zoe Lofgren’s statement that the statutory
amendment “mak[es] electronically produced information
coverable in court costs” supports the conclusion that Congress’s
intention was to permit the taxation of electronic discovery
costs.87 However, the scope of taxation remains unclear and the
§ 1920 language as amended “leaves for the courts the task of
defining what constitutes ‘making copies’ for purposes of sifting
the activities that go into producing electronic documents.”88
2.

Section 1920 and Developments in the Case Law

a.

The Supreme Court Adopts a Narrow Interpretation of
Interpreter Costs Under § 1920(6)

The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Taniguchi v. Kan
Pacific Saipan,89
provides helpful guidance on the proper
interpretation of § 1920.90 There, the Supreme Court considered
whether the costs associated with translating written documents
were taxable under § 1920(6), which provides, “A judge or

83

Hoelting, supra note 33, at 1119.
Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
111-406, 122 Stat. 4291.
85
See id. at 4292.
86
154 CONG. REC. 22,532 (2008).
87
Id. at 22,824.
88
CBT Flint Partners v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
89
132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
90
See id. at 2000. While Taniguchi certainly provides helpful guidance on the
proper interpretation of § 1920, the Court’s holding in this case pertained only to
§ 1920(6) and therefore, it is not directly applicable to the taxation of electronic
discovery costs under § 1920(4). Id.
84
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clerk . . . may tax as a cost . . . compensation of interpreters.”91
The plaintiff, a professional baseball player in Japan, brought a
personal injury action against the defendant resort owner for
injuries he sustained while visiting the premises.92 After the
district court granted summary judgment in the defendant’s
favor, the defendant sought to recover the costs it incurred in
translating various documents from Japanese to English.93
Despite the plaintiff’s objection, the district court awarded the
costs to the defendant as “compensation of interpreters” under
§ 1920(6).94 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of costs and
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.95 The Court rejected a
broad reading of the costs enumerated in the statute and held
that the costs of translating documents were not fairly considered
“compensation for interpreters” under the ordinary meaning of
“interpreter.”96 Although the word costs may be synonymous
with expenses, the Court emphasized its decision to endorse a
narrow scope of taxable costs and stated that “[t]axable costs are
limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses.”97
b.

The Courts Define “Exemplification” as It Is Used in § 1920(4)

Section 1920(4) provides that a judge or clerk may tax as a
cost “[f]ees for exemplification.”98 The courts are divided as to the
meaning of “exemplification” and the costs that are recoverable
under the provision.99 The circuit split regarding the correct
interpretation of “exemplification” is beyond the scope of this
Note. However, a brief overview is useful for the purpose of
demonstrating that electronic discovery costs fall outside the
scope of “[f]ees for exemplification” and are more appropriately
considered “costs of making copies.”

91
See id. Section 1920(6) provides that a judge or clerk may tax as costs
“compensation of interpreter.” 28 U.S.C § 1920(6) (2012).
92
See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2000.
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
See id. at 2000–01.
96
See id. at 2006–07.
97
Id. at 2006.
98
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012).
99
See Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 159 (3d
Cir. 2012).
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In 2002, in Kohus v. Cosco, Inc.,100 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the plaintiff
could recover the cost of a video exhibit as a “[f]ee[] for
exemplification” under § 1920(4).101 In determining the meaning
of “exemplification,” the Federal Circuit applied the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s narrow
interpretation and concluded that exemplification meant “an
official transcript of a public record, authenticated as a true copy
for use as evidence.”102 In applying this standard, the court
concluded that the video exhibit’s cost was not taxable as a
“[f]ee[] for exemplification.”103 Conversely, in its 2000 decision,
Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove,104 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted a broad
interpretation.105 The defendants sought to recover the cost of a
multimedia presentation system under § 1920(4) as a “[f]ee[] for
exemplification.”106 The court held that exemplification fees
could be awarded under the statute for the cost of creating any
exhibit “[s]o long as the means of presentation furthers the
illustrative purpose of [the] exhibit.”107
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, it seems that
the courts are in agreement that electronic discovery costs fall
outside the type of costs that are fairly recoverable as “[f]ees for
exemplification.”108 In its 2013 decision, Country Vintner of
North Carolina, LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery,109 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the
appellant’s argument that extracting text and metadata
constituted exemplification because those processes “illustrate by
example [the] important features of the native files.”110 The
appellant also argued that loading ESI into a review platform
100

282 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1356.
102
Id. at 1359.
103
Id.
104
211 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2000).
105
See id. at 428.
106
Id. at 427.
107
Id. at 428.
108
See Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249,
261–62 (4th Cir. 2013); Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1359 (stating that “[a] video obviously is
not a copy of paper” in considering whether the costs of a video exhibit were
recoverable under § 1920(4)).
109
718 F.3d 249.
110
Id. at 261.
101
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constituted exemplification because it “illustrates by example the
important features of the ESI as if someone were seeing the ESI
in its native computer environment.”111 The court declined the
invitation to adopt an interpretation of “exemplification” and
instead held that none of the electronic discovery charges at issue
qualified as “[f]ees for exemplification” under any conceivable
Since this Note is concerned with electronic
definition.112
discovery costs, the remainder of this Note considers solely the
proper interpretation of the “costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case.”113
c.

Taxable Electronic Discovery Costs are Limited to Those That
Are “Necessarily Obtained for Use in the Case”

Section 1920(4) refers to “the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case.”114 Thus, for an electronic discovery cost to be taxable, it
must be considered a “cop[y],” and it must also be “necessarily
obtained for use in the case.”115 While the necessity analysis is
inextricably intertwined with the rest of the statutory language,
there is some guidance to be gleaned from the meaning of
“necessarily obtained for use in the case” as it is used in
§ 1920(4).116
As one court stated, “before the Court can tax costs, it must
find that the costs were necessarily incurred in the litigation, and
this finding must be based on some proof of the necessity.”117 The
statute does not require that the copies be used at trial or in

111

Id.
Id. at 262.
113
Id. at 250.
114
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012).
115
Id.
116
See Steven C. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing
Party?, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537, 546 (2010) (“The dividing line between
‘necessary,’ and ‘for the convenience of counsel,’ however, is not particularly well
established.”).
117
Pioneer Natural Res. USA, Inc. v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., No. 050224, 2009 WL 4020563, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009).
112

FINAL_KWARTLER

2015]

6/28/2016 2:53 PM

POSTJUDGMENT COST SHIFTING

1327

papers filed with the court.118 However, costs that accrue for the
convenience of counsel are not necessarily obtained for use in the
case and are not taxable.119
This discussion provides a useful background for addressing
the contemporary issue. The 2006 amendments to the Federal
Rules and § 1920(4)’s statutory developments were driven, in
part, by the rising costs of electronic discovery. The case law
offers some guidance in understanding Congress’s intentions in
drafting § 1920(4) but many issues remain unresolved.
Specifically, the issue of which electronic discovery costs are
properly recoverable as the “costs of making copies” lingers on
and the courts have adopted different interpretations of the
statutory language.
II. THE COURTS ARE SPLIT REGARDING THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF § 1920
Until recently, many district courts adopted a broad
interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “costs of making copies” language
and taxed nearly all of a prevailing litigant’s costs. These courts
relied on numerous policy considerations to justify their
expansive reading of the statute. However, since the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s and United States
Supreme Court’s decisions announced in 2012, the broad
interpretation has lost support among the courts. Both of these
courts adopted a narrow interpretation of the “costs of making
copies.” Although it addressed the taxation of “compensation of
interpreters,” the Supreme Court’s decision in Taniguchi has
influenced the interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “cost[s] of making
copies.”120
While only the Third, Fourth,121 and Federal
118
See Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 955 (1948). The
1948 revision of the Judicial Code broadened the statutory language from “obtained
for use on trials” to “obtained for use in the case.” Id.
119
See Boykin Anchor Co. v. AT&T Corp., No. 5:10-CV-591-FL, 2014 WL
4798726, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2014); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, No. CV 07-5359,
2011 WL 3759927, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (holding costs were necessary and
not merely for the convenience of counsel because discovery requests were extremely
extensive and costly). But see Roehrs v. Conesys, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-829-M, 2008 WL
755187, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2008) (refusing to tax costs for electronic imaging
because digital versions were merely convenient for counsel to search and examine
and were not necessary).
120
See Jennifer Leland, What Courts Consider When Deciding E-Discovery Cost
Awards, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2014, at 12; Preston Register, How Much Do I Owe You for
That Copy? Defining Awards Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), 65 ALA. L. REV. 1087, 1099
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Circuit—applying Eleventh Circuit law—have addressed the
issue since the statute was amended in 2008, it appears that the
courts are turning away from the formerly well-received broad
interpretation.122 It is certainly still possible that a circuit court
may revive the broad interpretation, but for now it seems that
the scales have tipped in favor of the narrow interpretation.123
A.

Early Interpretations Adopt a Broad Approach to the
Taxation of Costs

Prior to 2012, several courts adopted a broad interpretation
of § 1920(4)’s “costs of making copies” and taxed all, or nearly all,
of a prevailing litigant’s electronic discovery costs. Courts found
such an interpretation permissible in light of numerous policy
considerations. One such consideration is the technical expertise
required in modern electronic discovery.124 Because the processes
required to produce ESI are highly technical and beyond the
expertise of the typical attorney, electronic discovery vendor
services are an indispensable part of document production.125 For
example, in Tibble v. Edison International,126 the prevailing
litigant sought to recover the costs paid to an electronic discovery
(2014) (“Further, the recent Supreme Court decision regarding the continuing
interpretation of FRCP 54(d) and § 1920(6) in regards to ‘compensation of
interpreters’ shows a possible trend towards a narrow interpretation of what is
encompassed in the court's taxable cost.”).
121
In its 2013 decision, Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the
Third Circuit’s approach from Race Tires. 718 F.3d 249, 260–61 (4th Cir. 2013).
122
See, e.g., Structural Metals, Inc. v. S & C Elec. Co., SA-09-CV-984-XR, 2013
WL 3790450, at *9 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2013) (finding persuasive the reasoning in
Race Tires and adopting a narrow interpretation); Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., C
09-01714 WHA (LB), 2012 WL 6761576, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012) (refusing to
tax costs attributable to production, extraction, and metadata).
123
David Herr & Steve Baicker-McKee, Award of E-Discovery Costs, 29 No. 4
FED. LITIGATOR 15 (April 2014).
124
Doug Austin, eDiscovery Trends: Is eDiscovery Malpractice More Widespread
Than You Think?, EDISCOVERY DAILY BLOG (July 6, 2011), http://www.cloudnine
discovery.com/ediscoverydaily/ediscovery-trends-is-ediscovery-malpractice-morewidespread-than-you-think/.
125
See id.; CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376,
1381 (N.D. Ga. 2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System, Electronic Discovery: A View From The
Front Lines at 15 (2008), available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/
publications/EDiscovery_View_Front_Lines2007.pdf (explaining that “hiring an ediscovery consultant is starting to look mandatory” because “[o]rganizations are
afraid of discovery sanctions and their lawyers are afraid of malpractice suits”).
126
No. CV 07-5359 SVW, 2011 WL 3759927, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011).
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vendor hired to produce ESI.127 The requesting party sought
documents over a decade old, which were deleted, fragmented, or
stored on electronic media or network drives.128 The court held
that such costs were properly taxable under § 1920(4) due to the
expertise required in unearthing the vast amount of
computerized data sought by the requesting party in discovery.129
Additionally, expert vendors promote efficiency and save costs so
it is beneficial to encourage their use.130 For example, in
Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Advanced Environmental Systems,131 the prevailing litigant
sought to recover $4.6 million in costs for creating a litigation
database.132 The court held that such costs were recoverable
because “it saved immense time for counsel who otherwise would
have to sift through the documents by hand.”133 Moreover,
shifting vendor costs effectively limits a party’s unreasonable
Courts advanced these policy
discovery requests.134
considerations to justify the taxation of immense costs, but courts
opting for the narrow interpretation soon rejected such policy
considerations as a sound justification.
B.

A Narrow Interpretation Gains Support in Recent Years

While it is still possible that a circuit court may adopt a
broad interpretation, the courts now appear to be split regarding
which electronic discovery processes fit within the narrow
interpretation. In Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing
Tire Corp.,135 the Third Circuit adopted an unduly strict narrow
interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “costs of making copies.”
Subsequently, in CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,136
127

Id.
Id.
129
Id. at *6. The court did not indicate which portion of the statute’s language
authorized the taxation.
130
See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litigation, 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa.
2011).
131
No. CV-98-316-E-BLW, 2006 WL 2095876, at *2 (D. Idaho July 27, 2006).
132
Id.
133
Id. The court did not specify which language under § 1920(4) authorized the
taxation of such costs and simply stated that “these costs are recoverable under
§ 1920(4).” Id.
134
See CBT Flint Partners v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381
(N.D. Ga. 2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
135
674 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2012).
136
737 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
128
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the Federal Circuit, applying Eleventh Circuit law, took the
opportunity to determine which electronic discovery services are
recoverable under § 1920(4). The CBT Flint court also adopted a
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “cost of making copies”
language but took a looser approach than the Race Tires court.137
1.

The Third Circuit Adopts the Strict Narrow Approach

In Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., the
Third Circuit addressed whether electronic discovery vendor
charges incurred in collecting, processing and producing ESI
were taxable against a losing party as “[f]ees for exemplification
[or] the cost of making copies of any materials.”138 In this case,
plaintiff Race Tires alleged violations of the Sherman Act against
defendant Hoosier Racing Tire Corporation and sought damages
exceeding $30 million.139 Not surprisingly for a case of this
nature and magnitude, “the parties engaged in extensive
discovery of ESI.”140
The district court issued a detailed Case Management Order
(“CMO”) instructing the parties on certain production
formalities.141 The CMO instructed the parties to agree upon a
list of keyword search terms where the use of such terms would
presumptively fulfill the parties’ “obligation to conduct a
reasonable search.”142 Additionally, the CMO ordered the parties
to produce files in Tagged Image File Format (“TIFF”),
accompanied by a cross reference or unitization file.143 The CMO
“identified certain metadata fields that had to be produced if
reasonably available” and directed the parties to produce an
extracted text file.144
137

Id. at 1326.
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 159. The court acknowledged the conflicting results
among courts that had previously addressed the issue. Id.
139
See id. at 160–61.
140
Id. at 161.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. Tagged Image File Format (“TIFF”) is “[a] widely used and supported
graphic file format[] for storing bit-mapped images, with many different compression
formats and resolutions.” See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
GLOSSARY: E–DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 50 (3rd ed. 2010).
Unitization is “[t]he assembly of individually scanned pages into documents.” Id. at
52.
144
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161. Metadata is “[d]ata typically stored
electronically that describes characteristics of ESI, found in different places in
different forms.” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY, supra note 143, at 34. The
138

FINAL_KWARTLER

2015]

6/28/2016 2:53 PM

POSTJUDGMENT COST SHIFTING

1331

To manage such complexities, both defendants in the case
hired electronic discovery vendors to assist with the production of
ESI.145
The parties produced thousands of documents:
Defendant Hoosier produced 430,733 pages of ESI, and defendant
DMS produced 178,413 electronic documents.146
Upon the
conclusion of discovery, both defendants filed summary judgment
motions, which were granted.147
Both defendants filed their Bills of Costs with the Clerk for
the District Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d).148 Race Tires “categorized the activities conducted by the
vendors as follows: (1) preservation and collection of ESI;
(2) processing the collected ESI; (3) keyword searching;
(4) culling privileged material; (5) scanning and TIFF conversion;
(6) optical character recognition (“OCR”) conversion; and
(7) conversion of racing videos from VHS format to DVD
Both defendants sought to recover electronic
format.”149
discovery costs under § 1920(4): Defendant Hoosier claimed
$143,007.05, and defendant DMS listed $241,139.37.150 The
Clerk awarded Hoosier $125,580.55151 and granted DMS’s full
request.152 Consequently, Race Tires filed a Motion to Review
Taxation of Costs in the district court.153
The district court held that the all of the electronic discovery
vendor’s costs were taxable.154 The court reasoned that “the steps
the third-party vendor(s) performed appeared to be the electronic
discovery of this data is important because “[s]ome metadata, such as file dates and
sizes, can easily be seen by users[,] other metadata can be hidden or embedded and
unavailable to computer users who are not technically adept.” Id. An extracted text
file—a corollary to data extraction—is a file that contains text taken from an
original electronic document. Id. at 12.
145
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161.
146
Id. at 162.
147
Id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. See Race Tires
Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
148
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 162; FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
149
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161–62.
150
Id. at 162. Defendant DMS initially sought $329,051.41, but upon Race Tire’s
objection, DMS acknowledged its vendor’s invoices “were exceedingly confused and
inconsistent” and that, as a result, DMS “mistakenly included duplicate invoices.”
Id.
151
Id. The Clerk reduced the amount because certain services “were not done by
a third party, and therefore are part of the costs of litigating.” Id.
152
Id. at 163.
153
Id. Race Tires also filed a “Motion to Appoint Special Master Regarding EDiscovery Issues,” which the district court declined. Id.
154
Id.
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equivalent of exemplification and copying” and that “the
requirements and expertise necessary to retrieve and
prepare . . . e-discovery documents for production were an
indispensable part of the discovery process.”155 Further, the court
concluded that the vendor’s charges were “necessarily incurred
and reasonable.”156 Race Tires appealed the district court’s
taxation of costs.157
In conducting its analysis, the Third Circuit identified the
following general categories of electronic discovery services:
collecting and preserving ESI, processing and indexing ESI,
keyword searching of ESI for responsive and privileged
documents, converting native files to TIFF, and scanning paper
documents to create electronic images.158 The court held that
only the scanning and conversion of native files to the agreedupon format for production fall within the statute.159 The court
affirmed the district court’s award of $20,083.51, representing
the scanning and TIFF conversion Hoosier performed.160
The court announced many sound reasons to support its
decision. First, the court criticized decisions that allow the
taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic discovery vendor
charges for being “untethered from the statutory mooring.”161
The court voiced its disapproval of the policy reasons typically
advanced in support of a broad interpretation:
Section 1920(4) does not state that all steps that lead up to the
production of copies of materials are taxable. It does not
authorize taxation merely because today’s technology requires
technical expertise not ordinarily possessed by the typical legal
professional. It does not say that activities that encourage cost
savings may be taxed.162

155

Id.
Id. The court made this conclusion, however, without analyzing each of the
discrete services the vendors performed. Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 167.
159
Id.
160
Id. DMS’s electronic discovery vendor invoices did not disclose any charges
for scanning or TIFF conversion. Id. at n.8.
161
Id. at 169.
162
Id. The court furthered acknowledged that extensive processing of
electronically stored information is an indispensible part of production “[b]ut that
does not mean that the services leading up to the actual production constitute
‘making copies.’ ” Id.
156
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Second, the court reasoned that even in the predigital era of
document production, numerous steps preceded the actual act of
making copies but none would have been considered taxable
because “Congress did not authorize taxation of charges
necessarily incurred to discharge discovery obligations.”163 Third,
the court found the technical expertise argument unpersuasive
as the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) suggests fees are not
permitted for the intellectual effort involved in producing the
documents.164 Fourth, the court held that equitable concerns,
such as the expertise necessary to retrieve and prepare electronic
discovery documents, could not justify an award of costs.165
Finally, the court stated that litigants could protect themselves
from undue burden or expense through Rule 26, which neither
defendant attempted to do in this case.166
2.

The Federal Circuit Adopts a Looser Interpretation of the
Narrow Approach

In 2013, the Federal Circuit, applying Eleventh Circuit
law,167 took the opportunity to decide which electronic discovery
costs are taxable under § 1920(4) as “costs of making copies.”168
In CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,169 plaintiff CBT
Flint sued defendants Return Path and Cisco for patent
infringement.170 The district court granted the defendants’
summary judgment motions.171

163

Id.
Id. The court explained this process as follows: First, paper files needed to be
located. Once found, a document reviewer had to travel to the location to review
those that may have been relevant. Then the documents had to be screened for
privileged material. In the end, a large number of documents would have been
processed to produce a smaller set of relevant documents. Id.
165
Id. at 170.
166
Id. at 170–71.
167
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of
a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act
of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). Since the appeal at
issue here involves cost taxation under § 1920(4) and not the disposition of the
patent claim, the Federal Circuit applied Eleventh Circuit law.
168
See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1324.
171
Id.
164
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Defendant Cisco moved to recover costs under § 1920,
including $243,453.02 in fees it had paid to its electronic
discovery vendor.172 In 2009, the district court granted Cisco’s
motion after noting “a division of opinion as to whether
[electronic
discovery]
costs
are
recoverable
under
28 U.S.C. § 1920.”173 The court concluded that the costs were
recoverable and reasoned that the fees Cisco sought to recover
were “the 21st Century equivalent of making copies,” implicitly
authorizing this recovery under § 1920(4).174 Further, the court
explained that such costs were taxable because the vendor’s
services were highly technical and beyond the expertise of
attorneys or paralegals.175 Policy considerations influenced the
court’s holding as well. The court recognized the “enormous
burden and expense of electronic discovery” and that “[t]axation
of these costs will encourage litigants to exercise restraint in
burdening the opposing party with the huge cost of unlimited
demands for electronic discovery.”176
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the summary
judgment ruling and vacated the district court’s order on costs
because Cisco was no longer a prevailing party.177 On remand,
the district court granted summary judgment and entered an
amended final judgment concluding that defendant Cisco and
defendant Return Path were entitled to recover their costs.178
Each party submitted a bill of costs: Cisco sought to recover
$243,453.02, and Return Path listed $33,858.51 for electronic
discovery.179 The clerk taxed each party’s costs in full.180 CBT
Flint then appealed.181

172

Id. Cisco labeled those fees “other costs” on its bill of costs. Id.
Id.
174
Id. at 1324–25. Before computers revolutionized document production, courts
interpreted § 1920(4) as referring to the cost of making physical copies of documents
and taxed the cost of paper. See, e.g., Roberts v. Charter Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 112
F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
175
CBT Flint, 737 F.3d at 1324.
176
Id. at 1325.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. Before appealing, CBT submitted a motion to review the taxation of costs,
which was denied. Id.
173
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The court’s central holding was that recoverable costs
include “those costs necessary to duplicate an electronic
document in as faithful and complete a manner as required by
rule, by court order, by agreement of the parties, or otherwise.”182
The court elaborated, however, that “only the costs of creating
the produced duplicates are included” and “preparatory or
ancillary costs commonly incurred leading up to, in conjunction
with, or after duplication” are not included.183 For purposes of
analyzing the document production process, the court broke the
process into three stages: (1) copying hard drives; (2) database
organization, indexing, decryption, de-duplication, filtering,
analyzing, searching, and reviewing for responsive documents;
and (3) copying documents onto memory media—such as DVDs
or hard drives—for viewing.184
In analyzing stage one, the court held that imaging a source
drive and extracting requested data embody procedures that are
more akin to making copies than attorney and paralegal review
and are thus properly taxable.185 Next, the court concluded that
none of the stage two activities were properly taxable.186 The
court reasoned that such processes are merely a part of the large
body of discovery obligations pertaining to document review,
which was not in Congress’s contemplation in drafting
§ 1920(4).187 In short, the court held that costs incurred for
counsel’s convenience are not recoverable.188
In responding to Cisco’s argument that some of the costs
were due to requests CBT Flint made, the court opined:
A litigant faced with what it views as overbroad discovery
requests or vexatious discovery tactics—or even unduly fruitless
or burdensome negotiations over discovery obligations—must
pursue relief by other means, such as seeking court orders to

182

Id. at 1328.
Id.
184
Id. at 1328–29.
185
Id. at 1329. This analysis is the main difference between the two narrow
interpretations. The Race Tires court did not consider imaging a source file an
appropriately taxable cost under § 1920(4). Id. at 1333.
186
Id. at 1331.
187
Id.
188
Id. The court expressly stated that costs of acquiring and configuring a new
data-hosting server were not recoverable. Id. Nor were costs of litigation support
tasks like training in the use of document review software, or meetings or
communications relating to the copying. Id.
183
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limit the discovery when the problems arise or seeking
reimbursement of costs or fees or payment of penalties
afterwards under authority other than section 1920(4).189

Despite Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii)’s requirement that ESI be
produced “in a reasonably useable form,” and Rule 34(a)(1)(A)’s
requirement that a party translate ESI into such form, the court
concluded that the cost to decrypt was not recoverable.190
Similarly, the court found that deduplication costs were not
taxable because deduplication is performed before or after
copying and is not the actual making of copies.191
Finally, the court turned its attention to stage three costs.
Without objection from the parties, the court held that the costs
of copying responsive documents to production media are
recoverable under § 1920(4) as “costs of making copies.”192
The CBT Flint court recognized that its application departed
from the Third Circuit’s holding in Race Tires in one way.193 The
CBT Flint court considered the costs associated with imaging a
source drive and extracting requested data as properly
recoverable as “costs of making copies” while the Race Tires court
did not.194 The court explained, “there is no good reason, as a
189
Id. Cisco argued that much of the keyword searching and data analysis the
vendor performed was at CBT Flint’s request. Id. The court made clear, however,
that “the requester’s demands for activities other than making copies does not bring
those non-copying activities within the provision.” Id.
190
Id. The court reasoned that in a paper analogous case, if a party chose to
store their documents in remote Tuva for safekeeping, the cost of retrieving the
documents would not be taxable as a cost of making copies. Id.
191
Id. at 1331–32.
192
Id. at 1332. The CBT Flint majority opinion was not well received in its
entirety. Judge O’Malley dissented regarding the majority’s decision to tax stage one
costs. There, Judge O’Malley explained that the majority fell astray in allowing
policy considerations to influence its decision to shift the stage one costs. Id. at
1334–35 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). In doing so, the dissent contended that the
majority improperly expanded § 1920(4). Id. First, Judge O’Malley explained that
the Third and Fourth Circuits have agreed that initial imaging falls within the
“prelude to duplication.” Id. Permitting such taxation allows recovery for the cost of
documents ultimately not produced, which is not authorized by the statute. Id. at
1336–37. Second, Judge O’Malley explained that the majority opinion also ignored
the Supreme Court’s admonition in Taniguchi. Id. at 1335. Judge O’Malley’s third
reason for dissenting was that the majority’s approach created a complicated
taxation process, which contravenes Congress’s intent. Id. at 1336–37. Finally,
Judge O’Malley opined that many other options exist to alleviate the majority’s
propensity to shift costs to the requesting party and to address increasing costs of
electronic discovery. Id. at 1337–38.
193
Id. at 1333.
194
Id.
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default matter, to distinguish copying one part of an electronic
document (i.e., the part that is visible when printed) from copying
other parts (i.e., parts not immediately visible) when both parts
are requested.”195
While the Race Tires court and the CBT Flint court both
adopted a narrow interpretation, the courts’ opinions diverged
with respect to the electronic discovery services that are
recoverable as “costs of making copies.” The Race Tires court
opted for a strictly narrow interpretation and reasoned that
litigants may avoid immense discovery costs by utilizing other
means. Conversely, the CBT Flint court took a looser approach
under the narrow interpretation and taxed additional electronic
discovery processes. The different interpretations have created a
lack of uniformity among the courts, and this inconsistency must
be resolved to prevent injustice.
III. RESOLVING THE ISSUE
As the case law develops, it appears more courts are opting
to limit taxable costs, and for sound reasons. The policy
considerations advanced as justification for the broad
interpretation of “costs of making copies”—“expertise beyond the
lawyer’s ken, cost savings, and controlling discovery”—have no
basis in the statute’s language.196
While the narrow
interpretations of “costs of making copies” adopted by the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Third
Circuit both have merit, the Third Circuit’s approach is too
restrictive and compromises the fairness of the justice system.
Even though the Federal Circuit’s decision further complicated
an already uncertain area of law, it was the correct approach in
light of the compelling policy considerations at play.
It is important to resolve this issue for several reasons. The
strict narrow interpretation adopted by the Third Circuit
prevents the prevailing litigant from securing adequate recovery
of the hefty electronic discovery costs it expended in responding
to discovery requests. Consequently, more litigants will opt to
settle their cases to avoid bearing such expenses even if the case
would have been resolved in their favor on the merits. The
purpose of the justice system, and discovery in particular, is to
195
196

Id.
Callaway, supra note 70, at 210.
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uncover the truth. A case’s disposition should not turn on a
party’s financial capabilities. While the courts must remain true
to the statute and tax narrowly, it is more appropriate for the
courts to adopt the loose narrow interpretation because it
permits a prevailing litigant to recover a greater portion of its
electronic discovery costs. This interpretation is legally sound
and curtails the injustice that can result under the Third
Circuit’s approach.
A.

The Broad Interpretation Is Unpersuasive in Light of the
2012 Decisions

As the Third Circuit explained in Race Tires, the broad
interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “cost of making copies,” which taxes
all, or essentially all, electronic discovery services is “untethered
from the statutory mooring.”197 The statute’s language and
statutory history does not authorize the taxation of all steps
leading up to the production of copies.198 In the predigital era of
document production, numerous steps preceded the actual act of
“making copies.”199 Yet none of those preparatory steps would
have been considered taxable because “Congress did not
authorize taxation of charges necessarily incurred to discharge
discovery obligations.”200 Moreover, the Court’s announcement
that taxable costs under § 1920 are “modest in scope” casts a
shadow of doubt upon the broad interpretation of § 1920(4)’s “cost
of making copies” language.201
B.

Practical and Equitable Reasons Render the Loose Narrow
Interpretation Better Suited To Address Contemporary Needs
than the Strict Narrow Interpretation

In its decision in CBT Flint, the Federal Circuit recognized
that its holding departed from the Third Circuit’s ruling in Race
Tires.202 The Federal Circuit defended its decision to tax imaging
and extraction costs on two grounds.203 First, the court reasoned
197

Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 169 (3d Cir.

2012).
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id.
Id.
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1333 (Fed. Cir.

2013).
203

Id.
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that these processes are more akin to “making copies” than to
“attorney and paralegal review.”204 Second, the court explained
that there is no conceivable reason, “as a default matter, to
distinguish copying of one part of an electronic document” from
copying “other parts.”205 While the majority opinion was met
with a dissent that argued for the Third Circuit’s strict narrow
interpretation, the dissent and the Third Circuit’s opinion in
Race Tires overlook important considerations, which render their
reasoning unpersuasive.
This Note posits a loose narrow interpretation, like the one
adopted by the Federal Circuit in CBT Flint, is the proper
approach to taxing costs under § 1920(4). A combination of
practical reasons and policy considerations lead to this
conclusion. While the policy reasons advanced in support of the
broad interpretation have been met with criticism, they still have
merit and justify the adoption of an approach somewhere
between the over broad and strict narrow. Until Congress or the
Supreme Court offers more guidance on this legal issue, the loose
narrow interpretation must prevail.
1.

Utilizing Other Avenues To Avoid Costs Is Not a Guaranteed
Fix

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows a producing party
to refuse to produce ESI because it would be “unreasonably
burdensome and expensive when compared to the overall scope of
the case, including the amount of possible awards.”206 Pursuant
to the 2006 amendments to Rule 26, the courts have discretion to
shift production costs to the requesting party.207 First, the rule
requires the producing party to demonstrate that the information
requested is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost.”208 Second, even if the producing party meets its burden,
the requesting party may then demonstrate that “good cause”

204

Id.
Id.
206
David M. Fuqua & Whitney L. Foster, The Five Pillars of E-Discovery, 61
FED’N. DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 420, 434 (2011).
207
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Hoelting, supra note 33, at 1116.
208
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
205
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exists to force the producing party to produce the ESI.209 The
advisory committee contemplated several factors that the courts
may use in conducting the “good cause” analysis:
(1) [T]he specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of
information available from other and more easily accessed
sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that
seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more
easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant,
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other,
more easily accessible sources; (5) predictions as to the
importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the
parties’ resources.210

While the presumption remains that the producing party
must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests, in
the electronic discovery context,211 cost shifting serves as one
option for litigants facing costly requests.212 However, a litigant
may still be saddled with exorbitant production costs if opponent
is able to demonstrate “good cause” exists.
In the seminal electronic discovery cost shifting case, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered when cost shifting is appropriate.213 Consistent
with Rule 26, the Zubulake court held that cost shifting is only
appropriate “when electronic discovery imposes an ‘undue burden
or expense’ on the responding party.”214 A burden or expense is
undue when it “outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation,
and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the
issues.”215 However, under this inquiry, cost shifting is only
209

See id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (2006).
211
See Altman & Lewis, supra note 15, at 573.
212
See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (O’Malley, J., dissenting); In re Ricoh Co., 661 F.3d 1361, 1366–67 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (holding agreements to allocate costs are permissible and enforceable).
213
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
214
See id. at 318. The court cautioned that “cost shifting may effectively end
discovery, especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large
corporations.” Id. at 317. Further, the court explained that improper cost shifting
will undermine the important public policy consideration of resolving disputes on the
merits. Id. at 318. There is also a concern that improper cost shifting may deter
litigants from filing potentially meritorious claims. Id.
215
See id.
210
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appropriate when the ESI is kept in an inaccessible format.216
The “obvious negative corollary” to this rule is that there can be
no cost shifting for ESI that is accessible.217 Thus, from the
producing party’s perspective, there is an incentive to downgrade
ESI to an inaccessible format in hopes of obtaining a cost-shifting
order.218 Since inaccessible ESI is so costly to recover, the
ultimate result is a more expensive electronic discovery
process.219
Therefore, it seems that cost shifting is a permissible means
by which litigants can seek to avoid immense production costs
but there is no guarantee. The cost-shifting analysis depends on
the facts of each case,220 and it would be unwise to adopt an
interpretation that relies on a litigant’s ability to shift costs
through this avenue given the uncertainty and potential for
abuse.
Litigants can also utilize Rule 26 conferences to prepare a
discovery plan.221 The rule’s purpose is “to make discovery less
contentious, less costly, and less dependent on judicial
supervision.”222 Parties can use the conference to “narrow the
range of information sought” or to agree on keyword searches.223
Open and transparent discussions of this nature may lead to
more effective discovery practices but the rule does not compel
litigants to reach any agreements.224 The rules merely require
the parties to talk about electronic discovery and the
conversations may ultimately be fruitless.225

216
See id. Electronically stored information may be considered inaccessible
when it is erased, fragmented or damaged, or stored solely on backup tapes. See
Altman & Lewis, supra note 15, at 574.
217
See Mast, supra note 6, at 1839.
218
See id.
219
See id.
220
Adian K. Felix, E-Discovery: Shifting the Costs of Compliance, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practi
ce_series/e_discovery_shifting_the_costs_of_compliance.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2015).
221
See Fuqua, supra note 206, at 422.
222
See id.
223
See id. at 423.
224
See Borden et al., supra note 4, at 16–17.
225
See id. at 18.
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Similarly, litigants can also take advantage of local rules in
an attempt to avoid incurring extreme electronic discovery
costs.226 For example, the Northern District of Georgia Local
Rule 16.2 directs litigants to, among other things, discuss
potential limitations on electronic discovery.227 Thus, parties
have ample opportunity to discuss cost shifting and burdensome
However, in an adversarial system, the
discovery.228
effectiveness of such discussion is doubtful. Even if a litigant can
shift some of the costs to its adversary, the litigant could still be
left to bear an unfair portion of the costs for the ESI.
Thus, the other avenues through which a litigant may
attempt to minimize its discovery costs by shifting the costs to its
adversary are not certain to be beneficial. If such measures are
fruitless, or if the producing party does not seek pretrial cost
shifting, the party could be left to bear an unfair portion of the
cost attributable to producing the ESI, absent an appropriate
postjudgment cost-shifting mechanism.
2.

Equitable Considerations Tip the Balance in Favor of the
Loose Narrow Approach

While cost shifting and conferences appear to alleviate some
of the issues, it would be a mistake to consider those options a
resolution. Even though it is possible to shift costs under Rule
26, a party bears a heavy burden in establishing its propriety.229
For a party concerned about paying an electronic discovery
vendor’s bill, it would be a risk to rely on cost shifting.230 As
such, the strict narrow interpretation adopted by the Third
Circuit has the potential to create problems for clients who lack a
disposable source of funds.231

226
See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227
N.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.2.
228
See CBT Flint, 737 F.3d at 1337 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
229
See Callaway, supra note 70, at 216. For example, commentators have
criticized the Zubulake approach as unduly restrictive. See Mast, supra note 6, at
1829.
230
See Callaway, supra note 70, at 216–17.
231
See id. at 215–17.

FINAL_KWARTLER

2015]

6/28/2016 2:53 PM

POSTJUDGMENT COST SHIFTING

1343

Under the strict narrow interpretation, a prevailing party
will only be able to recover a minor portion of the expenses it
expended in producing the ESI.232 This situation creates a
problem when the electronic vendor costs greatly exceed the
amount in controversy in the suit.233 In this situation, a wouldbe-prevailing litigant has no incentive to continue the litigation.
A similar problem plagues litigants who cannot afford an
electronic vendor. The volume of ESI and the complexity
involved in producing such documents renders electronic
discovery vendors a necessity.234 The courts used this reasoning
to justify the broad interpretation.235 Although such reasoning
has been met with criticism, if a litigant cannot afford an
electronic discovery vendor, he or she may be faced with
sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for failing to
comply with a discovery request or a subsequent order to
compel.236 Accordingly, the strict narrow interpretation adopted
by the Third Circuit leaves a prevailing party with no way to
recover the immense fees expended on document production and
could discourage parties from bringing or continuing a case for
fear of facing discovery sanctions.
Individuals are entitled to their day in court regardless of
their financial situation. Individual plaintiffs of ordinary means
have no incentive to litigate their cases when even if they prevail,
the electronic discovery costs will exceed the award. The loose
narrow interpretation comports with the statutory history and
Supreme Court precedent and puts individual plaintiffs in a
better position when litigating a case. Under the loose narrow
interpretation, prevailing litigants can recover the costs
associated with imaging and extraction while it could not under
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of “costs of making copies.”
The taxation of these costs alleviates the burden of paying for
costly electronic discovery and reduces a would-be-prevailing
litigant’s fear that its monetary recovery will be completely
neutralized by electronic discovery expenses.

232
233
234
235
236

See id.
See Kolkey & Ragan, supra note 16.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See Callaway, supra note 70, at 215.
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Since the Third Circuit’s approach to resolving the issue
remains uncertain, it would be unwise to adopt such a restrictive
interpretation when it effectively eliminates individual plaintiffs’
ability to participate in the adversarial system. Until these
uncertainties are resolved, in the interests of fairness, the courts
must adopt an approach that is both legally sound and conducive
to average litigants’ needs. The loose narrow interpretation
allows litigants to recover a larger portion of their electronic
discovery costs but remain “tethered to the statutory mooring.”
CONCLUSION
To ensure fairness in the justice system, a uniform approach
is needed in taxing costs under § 1920(4). As discussed above,
electronic discovery’s costly nature is a reality that impacts
modern litigation. While it seems that a broad interpretation
contravenes congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent,
both of the narrow interpretations are in conformity. Thus, until
the legal community receives further guidance on the issue, the
better approach is the loose narrow interpretation, which fairly
serves the justice system and litigants alike.

